What is Stuxnet?
First of all, it's important (and a bit hilarious) to know the story behind Stuxnet. If you're researching Stuxnet for the first time, it's really easy to get confused. There's finger pointing, claims, supposed "confirmed sources", etc, left and right. I'll briefly go over it. For example:
Confirmed: US and Israel created Stuxnet, lost control of it.
The article is adapted from journalist David Sanger's forthcoming book, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, and it confirms that both the US and Israeli governments developed and deployed Stuxnet.Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.
Computer security experts who began studying the worm, which had been developed by the United States and Israel, gave it a name: Stuxnet.US unleashed Stuxnet cyber war on Iran to appease Israel – report.
The US and Israel made the Stuxnet virus as a new kind of weapon targeted against Iran, a media investigation revealed. The operation reportedly started in the Bush era, but was intensified by Obama administration.Snowden confirms NSA created Stuxnet with Israeli aid.
“The NSA and Israel wrote Stuxnet together,” Snowden told Applebaum in the interview that was carried out in May.The big TLDR is here - Operation Olympic Games.
My initial reaction was "What the hell am I reading?", and it still sort of is. It goes on and on. All in all, after reading the above, you're likely inclined to believe that the US (and maybe even Israel) were behind Stuxnet. Whether or not this is true is a story for another day, although it's easier to lean towards 'yes' than it is to 'no'. The reason for this is due to the fact that Stuxnet as I discussed above used four zero-day flaws within Windows. It's a pretty big deal when malware exploits one zero-day flaw within the OS, but four is extremely high.
It's also pretty laughable to think that Stuxnet was created by amateurs not invested in any sort of organization regarding cyber warfare, etc of some sort, or amateurs in general. A lot of amateurs make malware for a lot of reasons, but causing nuclear centrifuges to commit suicide is pretty advanced. Aside from the many reasons to believe the answer is yes, some may lean towards no, and it's largely due to the fact that most cannot imagine the US and Israel working closely together to create something like Stuxnet.
I digress, and in any case, I'm not here to discuss politics or debate the true creator(s), so let's just get to the part where we talk about what Stuxnet was primarily created for. Stuxnet is a worm that was developed primarily to target industrial PLCs, which led to the nuclear centrifuges ultimately destroying themselves. The malware obviously couldn't be outright sent to the nuclear facilities themselves, so this is where its USB attack vector comes into play. More notably known as a supply chain attack:
So the creators of Stuxnet, they were thinking that these companies would do some communications with power plant workers; maybe exchange with USB devices. That’s probably how Stuxnet infected the system.
In the end, Stuxnet ended up destroying nearly one-fifth of Iran's centrifuges. In November 2010, it was reported that uranium enrichment within the Natanz nuclear facility had halted several times due to severe technical issues.
User-Mode
Stuxnet has two ways of injecting itself into the address space of a process and then executing exported functions. Stuxnet's user-mode modules are implemented as DLLs, and the first method is done by injecting itself into a preexisting process.
Preexisting Process Inject
1. Allocates a memory buffer in the calling process for the modules to be loaded.
2. Patches ntdll and hooks the following APIs:
- ZwQueryAttributesFile.
- ZwQuerySection.
Here's what a clean (unpatched) ntdll MZ header looks like:
We can see some of these hooks in action:
We can see some of these hooks in action:
ServiceDescriptor n°0
---------------------
ServiceTable : nt!KiServiceTable (804e26a8)
ParamTableBase : nt!KiArgumentTable (80510088)
NumberOfServices : 0000011c
Index Args Check System call
----- ---- ----- -----------
0019 0001 HOOK-> f8c5761c ##### Original -> nt!NtClose (805678dd)
0029 0007 HOOK-> f8c575d6 ##### Original -> nt!NtCreateKey (8057065d)
0032 0007 HOOK-> f8c57626 ##### Original -> nt!NtCreateSection (805652b3)
0035 0008 HOOK-> f8c575cc ##### Original -> nt!NtCreateThread (8058e63f)
003F 0001 HOOK-> f8c575db ##### Original -> nt!NtDeleteKey (805952be)
0041 0002 HOOK-> f8c575e5 ##### Original -> nt!NtDeleteValueKey (80592d50)
0044 0007 HOOK-> f8c57617 ##### Original -> nt!NtDuplicateObject (805715e0)
0062 0002 HOOK-> f8c575ea ##### Original -> nt!NtLoadKey (805aed5d)
007A 0004 HOOK-> f8c575b8 ##### Original -> nt!NtOpenProcess (805717c7)
0080 0004 HOOK-> f8c575bd ##### Original -> nt!NtOpenThread (8058a1bd)
00B1 0006 HOOK-> f8c5763f ##### Original -> nt!NtQueryValueKey (8056a1f1)
00C1 0003 HOOK-> f8c575f4 ##### Original -> nt!NtReplaceKey (8064f0fa)
00C8 0003 HOOK-> f8c57630 ##### Original -> nt!NtRequestWaitReplyPort (80576ce6)
00CC 0003 HOOK-> f8c575ef ##### Original -> nt!NtRestoreKey (8064ec91)
00D5 0002 HOOK-> f8c5762b ##### Original -> nt!NtSetContextThread (8062dcdf)
00ED 0003 HOOK-> f8c57635 ##### Original -> nt!NtSetSecurityObject (8059b19b)
00F7 0006 HOOK-> f8c575e0 ##### Original -> nt!NtSetValueKey (80572889)
00FF 0006 HOOK-> f8c5763a ##### Original -> nt!NtSystemDebugControl (80649ce3)
0101 0002 HOOK-> f8c575c7 ##### Original -> nt!NtTerminateProcess (805822e0)
If we for example go ahead and disassemble our hooked nt!NtClose function, we see the following:
lkd> u 0xFFFFFFFFF8C5761C L1
f8c5761c e92d8b23fe jmp f6e9014e
We have a hook regarding nt!NtClose and a jump. Classic rootkit behavior. Let's go further and dump the IAT by loading notepad.exe into OlyDbg and viewing executable modules:
Address Section Type ( Name Comment
0100102C .text Import ( GDI32.AbortDoc
0100131C .text Import msvcrt._acmdln
0100132C .text Import msvcrt._adjust_fdiv
01001300 .text Import ( msvcrt._cexit
01001204 .text Import ( USER32.CharLowerW
01001244 .text Import ( USER32.CharNextW
010011C0 .text Import ( USER32.CharUpperW
01001248 .text Import ( USER32.CheckMenuItem
01001230 .text Import ( USER32.ChildWindowFromPoint
010012D0 .text Import ( comdlg32.ChooseFontW
0100124C .text Import ( USER32.CloseClipboard
010010F8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.CloseHandle
010012B8 .text Import WINSPOOL.ClosePrinter
010012E0 .text Import ( comdlg32.CommDlgExtendedError
010010EC .text Import ( KERNEL32.CompareStringW
0100133C .text Import ( msvcrt._controlfp
01001040 .text Import ( GDI32.CreateDCW
01001214 .text Import ( USER32.CreateDialogParamW
010010B4 .text Import ( KERNEL32.CreateFileMappingW
01001104 .text Import ( KERNEL32.CreateFileW
01001064 .text Import ( GDI32.CreateFontIndirectW
01001020 .text Import ( COMCTL32.CreateStatusWindowW
010011E0 .text Import ( USER32.CreateWindowExW
010012F4 .text Import ( msvcrt._c_exit
010011A4 .text Import ( USER32.DefWindowProcW
01001034 .text Import ( GDI32.DeleteDC
01001158 .text Import ( KERNEL32.DeleteFileW
01001068 .text Import ( GDI32.DeleteObject
010011A8 .text Import ( USER32.DestroyWindow
01001198 .text Import ( USER32.DialogBoxParamW
01001294 .text Import ( USER32.DispatchMessageW
0100117C .text Import ( SHELL32.DragAcceptFiles
01001174 .text Import ( SHELL32.DragFinish
01001178 .text Import ( SHELL32.DragQueryFileW
01001210 .text Import ( USER32.DrawTextExW
0100125C .text Import ( USER32.EnableMenuItem
0100120C .text Import ( USER32.EnableWindow
01001288 .text Import ( USER32.EndDialog
01001030 .text Import ( GDI32.EndDoc
01001028 .text Import ( GDI32.EndPage
01001054 .text Import ( GDI32.EnumFontsW
01001308 .text Import ( msvcrt._except_handler3
010012F0 .text Import ( msvcrt._exit
01001318 .text Import ( msvcrt.exit
0100111C .text Import ( KERNEL32.FindClose
01001120 .text Import ( KERNEL32.FindFirstFileW
010012C8 .text Import ( comdlg32.FindTextW
010010F4 .text Import KERNEL32.FoldStringW
0100114C .text Import ( KERNEL32.FormatMessageW
0100115C .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetACP
01001188 .text Import ( USER32.GetClientRect
01001114 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetCommandLineW
010010C0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetCurrentProcess
0100110C .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetCurrentProcessId
0100108C .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetCurrentThreadId
01001238 .text Import ( USER32.GetCursorPos
010010A0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetDateFormatW
01001194 .text Import ( USER32.GetDC
010011E4 .text Import ( USER32.GetDesktopWindow
01001060 .text Import ( GDI32.GetDeviceCaps
0100122C .text Import ( USER32.GetDlgCtrlID
01001274 .text Import ( USER32.GetDlgItem
01001284 .text Import ( USER32.GetDlgItemTextW
01001124 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetFileAttributesW
010010B0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetFileInformationByHandle
010012D4 .text Import ( comdlg32.GetFileTitleW
010011E8 .text Import ( USER32.GetFocus
010011B4 .text Import ( USER32.GetForegroundWindow
010011A0 .text Import ( USER32.GetKeyboardLayout
01001138 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetLastError
010010D8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetLocaleInfoW
01001098 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetLocalTime
01001320 .text Import msvcrt.__getmainargs
01001264 .text Import ( USER32.GetMenu
01001258 .text Import ( USER32.GetMenuState
010012A8 .text Import ( USER32.GetMessageW
010010CC .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetModuleHandleA
0100105C .text Import ( GDI32.GetObjectW
010012D8 .text Import ( comdlg32.GetOpenFileNameW
0100128C .text Import ( USER32.GetParent
010012B4 .text Import WINSPOOL.GetPrinterDriverW
01001110 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetProcAddress
010012E4 .text Import ( comdlg32.GetSaveFileNameW
010010D0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetStartupInfoA
01001058 .text Import ( GDI32.GetStockObject
01001260 .text Import ( USER32.GetSubMenu
010011CC .text Import ( USER32.GetSystemMenu
0100121C .text Import ( USER32.GetSystemMetrics
010010B8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetSystemTimeAsFileTime
0100103C .text Import ( GDI32.GetTextExtentPoint32W
01001048 .text Import ( GDI32.GetTextFaceW
0100106C .text Import ( GDI32.GetTextMetricsW
01001090 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetTickCount
010010A4 .text Import KERNEL32.GetTimeFormatW
0100109C .text Import ( KERNEL32.GetUserDefaultLCID
01001150 .text Import KERNEL32.GetUserDefaultUILanguage
01001270 .text Import ( USER32.GetWindowLongW
010011BC .text Import ( USER32.GetWindowPlacement
01001218 .text Import ( USER32.GetWindowTextW
010010D4 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GlobalFree
010010A8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.GlobalLock
010010AC .text Import ( KERNEL32.GlobalUnlock
01001324 .text Import msvcrt._initterm
01001224 .text Import ( USER32.InvalidateRect
01001250 .text Import ( USER32.IsClipboardFormatAvailable
010012A0 .text Import ( USER32.IsDialogMessageW
010011B8 .text Import ( USER32.IsIconic
0100100C .text Import ADVAPI32.IsTextUnicode
01001304 .text Import ( msvcrt.iswctype
010011C8 .text Import ( USER32.LoadAcceleratorsW
010011D8 .text Import ( USER32.LoadCursorW
010011EC .text Import ( USER32.LoadIconW
010011D4 .text Import ( USER32.LoadImageW
010010C8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LoadLibraryA
010011C4 .text Import ( USER32.LoadStringW
010010E0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalAlloc
010010DC .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalFree
010010F0 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalLock
01001148 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalReAlloc
01001134 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalSize
010012FC .text Import ( msvcrt.localtime
010010E8 .text Import ( KERNEL32.LocalUnlock
01001074 .text Import ( GDI32.LPtoDP
01001118 .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrcatW
01001108 .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrcmpiW
01001128 .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrcmpW
01001130 .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrcpynW
010010FC .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrcpyW
010010E4 .text Import ( KERNEL32.lstrlenW
01001168 .text Import ( KERNEL32.MapViewOfFile
010011AC .text Import ( USER32.MessageBeep
01001268 .text Import ( USER32.MessageBoxW
0100739D .text Export <ModuleEntryPoint>
01001220 .text Import ( USER32.MoveWindow
0100112C .text Import ( KERNEL32.MulDiv
01001164 .text Import ( KERNEL32.MultiByteToWideChar
01001254 .text Import ( USER32.OpenClipboard
010012BC .text Import WINSPOOL.OpenPrinterW
010012C4 .text Import comdlg32.PageSetupDlgW
01001208 .text Import ( USER32.PeekMessageW
010012A4 .text Import ( USER32.PostMessageW
010011F4 .text Import ( USER32.PostQuitMessage
010012CC .text Import comdlg32.PrintDlgExW
01001330 .text Import msvcrt.__p__commode
01001334 .text Import msvcrt.__p__fmode
01001094 .text Import ( KERNEL32.QueryPerformanceCounter
01001100 .text Import ( KERNEL32.ReadFile
01001004 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegCloseKey
01001008 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegCreateKeyW
010011D0 .text Import ( USER32.RegisterClassExW
010011F8 .text Import ( USER32.RegisterWindowMessageW
01001014 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegOpenKeyExA
01001010 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegQueryValueExA
01001000 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegQueryValueExW
01001018 .text Import ( ADVAPI32.RegSetValueExW
01001190 .text Import ( USER32.ReleaseDC
010012DC .text Import ( comdlg32.ReplaceTextW
01001234 .text Import ( USER32.ScreenToClient
01001084 .text Import ( GDI32.SelectObject
0100123C .text Import ( USER32.SendDlgItemMessageW
01001240 .text Import ( USER32.SendMessageW
01001044 .text Import ( GDI32.SetAbortProc
0100119C .text Import ( USER32.SetActiveWindow
01001070 .text Import ( GDI32.SetBkMode
0100118C .text Import ( USER32.SetCursor
0100127C .text Import ( USER32.SetDlgItemTextW
01001154 .text Import ( KERNEL32.SetEndOfFile
01001278 .text Import ( USER32.SetFocus
01001140 .text Import ( KERNEL32.SetLastError
01001080 .text Import ( GDI32.SetMapMode
01001200 .text Import ( USER32.SetScrollPos
010010C4 .text Import ( KERNEL32.SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
01001328 .text Import msvcrt.__setusermatherr
0100107C .text Import ( GDI32.SetViewportExtEx
01001078 .text Import ( GDI32.SetWindowExtEx
0100126C .text Import ( USER32.SetWindowLongW
010011DC .text Import ( USER32.SetWindowPlacement
010011F0 .text Import ( USER32.SetWindowTextW
010012AC .text Import ( USER32.SetWinEventHook
01001338 .text Import msvcrt.__set_app_type
01001180 .text Import ( SHELL32.ShellAboutW
010011B0 .text Import ( USER32.ShowWindow
01001314 .text Import ( msvcrt._snwprintf
01001050 .text Import ( GDI32.StartDocW
01001038 .text Import ( GDI32.StartPage
010010BC .text Import ( KERNEL32.TerminateProcess
0100104C .text Import ( GDI32.TextOutW
010012F8 .text Import ( msvcrt.time
0100129C .text Import ( USER32.TranslateAcceleratorW
01001298 .text Import ( USER32.TranslateMessage
0100116C .text Import ( KERNEL32.UnhandledExceptionFilter
01001290 .text Import ( USER32.UnhookWinEvent
01001160 .text Import ( KERNEL32.UnmapViewOfFile
010011FC .text Import ( USER32.UpdateWindow
01001310 .text Import ( msvcrt.wcsncmp
01001340 .text Import ( msvcrt.wcsncpy
01001144 .text Import ( KERNEL32.WideCharToMultiByte
01001228 .text Import ( USER32.WinHelpW
0100113C .text Import ( KERNEL32.WriteFile
01001280 .text Import ( USER32.wsprintfW
0100130C .text Import ( msvcrt._wtol
010012EC .text Import msvcrt._XcptFilter
The Import Address Table (IAT) is essentially just a table of jumps. It's used primarily as a lookup table when an application is calling a function in a different module. Compiled programs cannot know the memory locations of the libraries they depend on, therefore an indirect jump (jmp) is required whenever an API call is made.
In the above code we can see jumps to functions such as USER32.GetKeyboardLayout, which is a wrapper for the NtUserLoadKeyboardLayoutEx win32k syscall. This is in regards to Stuxnet's keyboard layout vulnerability (CVE-2010-2743), which is one of four exploitative ways used to escalate privileges in order to reach ring 0.
I would have loved to set a breakpoint on win32k!NtUserLoadKeyboardLayoutEx and trace the malware as it's extremely interesting, but setting breakpoints is not possible on an LKD session. I would have needed to break in to another physical machine (which I don't have), or set up a host > virtual COM port, which is a bit of a pain. I'll chalk it up to something to do on a rainy day. Call me lazy... I know.
3. Calls LoadLibraryW which is exported from kernel32.dll and passes it as a parameter for specially crafted file names such as: KERNEL32.DLL.ASLR.[HEX] or SHELL32.DLL.ASLR.[HEX]. Below we can see an example of a KERNEL32 variant:
4. Calls desired exported function.
5. Calls FreeLibrary function to free load library.
New Process Inject
The second method of injection is done through injecting a newly created process, as such:
1. Creates host process.
2. Replaces process image with the Stuxnet module to execute and with code that will load the module and call a specificed export passing parameters.
There's a few different image names that can be chosen as the host process for the module:
- lsass.exe - MSFT system process in charge of enforcing the security policy.
- avp.exe - Kaspersky.
- mcshield.exe - McAfee VirusScan.
- avguard.exe - Avira Personal Edition.
- bdagent.exe - Bitdefender Switch Agent.
- UmxCfg.exe - eTrust Configuration Engine (HIPS).
- fsdfwd.exe - F-Secure.
- rtvscan.exe - Symantec Real time Virus Scan Service.
- ccSvchst.exe - Symantec Service Framework.
- ekrn.exe - ESET Service Process.
- tmproxy.exe - TrendMicro (PC-cillin in Australia and Virus Buster in Japan).
Malware Execution and Infection
First of all, to even successfully execute the malware you need to set your system time to before June 24th, 2012. This is due to the fact that Stuxnet hard-coded a poison pill to fully delete itself on June 24th, 2012. This was most likely done with the original idea in mind that Stuxnet wouldn't escape the nuclear facilities, which would allow time for Stuxnet to be reversed and ultimately defeated.
This piece of malware wanted to stay inside nuclear facilities, target Siemens systems, cause large actual damage, spread to cause more damage, and then go ghost. Fortunately, it did happen to escape its intended environment (some even speculate deliberately) and was inevitably reversed and defeated long before its hard-coded deletion date.
First of all, let's take a pre-infected look at the system with Autoruns + Process Explorer:
(Ignore the file not found messages)
Note the checked filter options > Verify code signatures + Hide Microsoft entries.
Everything looks to be pretty normal, and nothing really out of the ordinary. We can see we have one instance of lsass.exe.
Now let's turn things up a bit by executing the malware, and then comparing our results from pre-infection:
We can see now within Autoruns we have two new services - MRxCls and MRxNet. These are Stuxnet's kernel-mode drivers which enable its rookit functionality.
One big thing about malware that surfaces to the face of the public media (for whatever reason, we'll assume popularity/intention) is that journalists love to spin it and give awkward buzzwords - Undefeatable, The Most Sophisticated Malware, etc. Was Stuxnet an elborate piece of code? Yes, absolutely. Not only was knowledge needed regarding your typical rootkit/Win development, but heavy reverse engineering knowledge regarding Semens software was necessary as well.
However, one of Stuxnet's biggest weak points was its immense lack of anti-debugging/reversing techniques. Among a slew of reasons such as zero VM obfuscation, you can literally use the default regedit to find the locations of both MRxCLS and MRxNet. For example:
This had led Stuxnet to be something of a joke among some reverse engneers and analysts, even moreso if you believe that it was created by [insert government]. It's hard to imagine [insert government] wouldn't go to any lengths at all to hide its malware, but then again you never really know, right? : ) I'll continue the discussion regarding its kernel-mode functionality a little later as I'd like to swing back to user-mode real quick.
I couldn't get Process Explorer to run after infection, as the VM would bugcheck. I have no idea why, and AFAIK Stuxnet doesn't employ anti-debugging against Sysinternals tools by any means, so it was likely a buggy sample. I digress, and used VMmap instead:
We can see there's now three instances of lsass.exe, two of which are fake (newly created host processes). So first off, which is our legitmate lsass.exe? Well, 2/3 are the only ones above 1xxx regarding PID, so let's assume the only one not above 1xxx is legitimate:
%2Bafter.png)
If sort by Protection regarding the tabs, we can see it's mostly Execute/Read which doesn't raise any red flags. Let's assume for the moment this is legitimate and take a look at another one:
%2Bafter.png)
Uh oh, we can see two instances of memory that was chosen to share from this lsass.exe that has Write permissions in addition to Execute and Read. When a process has all three, it's a huge red flag for a fake/compromised process. In addition, note how the Size>Commited>Total Working Set, etc are equal. We can now at this point determine PID 648 is legitimate, and PID 1812 is fake. We can also at this point then assume that PID 1840 is fake as well:
%2Bafter.png)
Yep! In this case, we have five instances of memory that was chosen to be shared with R/W/E permissions, in addition to ntdll with R/W/E permissions as well. Note the Size>Commited>Total Working Set, etc equals again as well. At this point we can fully determine 1812 and 1840 are our fake lsass.exe instances, and 1840 is in relation to the patching of ntdll.
Let's further compare the three images based on their strings:
%2Bafter.png)
(PID 648 - legit)
%2Bafter%2Btop.png)
(PID 1812 - fake #1)
Note we have quite the changes here, with the important being "!This program cannot run in DOS mode.". This is the classic MZ exe format used for .exe files within DOS. We can note the ASCII string - 4D. Let's take a look at the bottom of the string list:
%2Bafter%2Bbottom.png)
(PID 1812 - fake #1)
We can see a number of functions, such as InternetOpen. We can at this point determine the DLL was successfully injected into this image of lsass.exe.
We can of course expect similar results with PID 1840:
%2Bafter%2Btop.png)
(PID 1840 - fake #2)
We can also see abnormal termination of the NT Kernel, as well as a jmp:
Another big red flag of a malformed image.
Let's head back to discussing our kernel-mode drivers, MRxCls and MRxNet. As noted above, these two drivers aren't packed whatsoever with a protector nor packer, so inspecting them in-depth is painless:
First off, both of these drivers were digitally signed (albeit fake... what a surprise) to fool the user into believing it was a legitmate driver signed off as such by VeriSign. For example:
We can see MRxCls was fake-signed by VeriSign which claimed to be from Realtek. Realtek is obviously a legitimate company and releases lots of software/drivers for their products, such as audio, so this would fool a user if they ever questioned the legitimacy of the apparent MRxCls/Net drivers.
Using SwishDbgExt, let's dump the list of objects:
lkd> !ms_object
Object: \ (Directory)
|------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hdle | Object Type | Addr | Name |
|------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0000 | Directory | 0xFFFFFFFFE100D748 | ArcName |
| 0000 | Device | 0xFFFFFFFF821C75C0 | Ntfs |
| 0000 | Port | 0xFFFFFFFFE15EABB8 | SeLsaCommandPort |
| 0000 | Key | 0xFFFFFFFFE1010478 | \REGISTRY |
| 0000 | Port | 0xFFFFFFFFE186B9E8 | ThemeApiPort |
| 0000 | Port | 0xFFFFFFFFE1B05230 | XactSrvLpcPort |
| 0000 | Directory | 0xFFFFFFFFE15AA4B8 | NLS |
| 0000 | SymbolicLink | 0xFFFFFFFFE1008748 | DosDevices |
| 0000 | Port | 0xFFFFFFFFE13D4B68 | SeRmCommandPort |
| 0000 | Port | 0xFFFFFFFFE173BA00 | LsaAuthenticationPort |
| 0000 | Device | 0xFFFFFFFF82063A90 | Dfs |
| 0000 | Event | 0xFFFFFFFF821EF5C0 | |
| 0000 | Directory | 0xFFFFFFFFE100E838 | Driver
Notice the strange 'Driver' object with a 'Directory' type. Let's take a look:
lkd> !ms_object 0xFFFFFFFFE100E838
Object: Driver (Directory)
|------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Hdle | Object Type | Addr | Name |
|------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF8231ECC0 | \Driver\Beep |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF821C72C0 | \Driver\NDIS |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF821D39C0 | \Driver\KSecDD |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF82198F38 | \Driver\Mouclass |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF82245410 | \Driver\Raspti |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF81F18768 | \Driver\es1371 |
... |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF81EA2880 | \Driver\MRxCls |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF821DE4A0 | \Driver\PCnet |
| 0000 | Driver | 0xFFFFFFFF81F0FAE8 | \Driver\MRxNet
Let's dump the driver object information for MRxNet:
lkd> !drvobj 81f0fae8
Driver object (81f0fae8) is for:
\Driver\MRxNet
Driver Extension List: (id , addr)
Device Object list:
820ee288 81f10020 81ebac80 82136298
82302298 82339be0 821bb500 821996c0
821bc238 8224a9d0
We can see MRxNet has a lot of device objects, so let's check one:
lkd> !devobj 81ebac80
Device object (81ebac80) is for:
\Driver\MRxNet DriverObject 81f0fae8
Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 0 Type 00000003 Flags 00000080
DevExt 81ebad38 DevObjExt 81ebad40
ExtensionFlags (0000000000)
AttachedTo (Lower) 821d4450 \FileSystem\Cdfs
Stuxnet creates new device objects and attaches to the device chain for each device object. As we can see, Stuxnet attached to cdfs.sys, which is part of the filesystem, specifically the CD-ROM filesystem driver. Other filesystem drivers it attaches to are: ntfs.sys, and fastfat.sys. After attaching, Stuxnet manages the driver object, which in turn provides Stuxnet with the ability to succesfully intercept IRP requests.
Other than checking regedit, we can also confirm the existence of the MRxCls service within the registry using the !dreg command, which displays formatted registry key information. Before we do this however, we need to load ntsdexts.dll, or we'll get the following:
lkd> !dreg System\CurrentControlSet\Services
No export dreg found
This is due to the fact that ntsdexts.dll isn't of course loaded in the extension DLL chain list:
lkd> .chain
Extension DLL search Path:
C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\arcade;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\pri;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86);C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\arcade;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem
Extension DLL chain:
dbghelp: image 6.12.0002.633, API 6.1.6, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:26 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\dbghelp.dll]
ext: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:31 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\ext.dll]
exts: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:24 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP\exts.dll]
kext: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:22 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\kext.dll]
kdexts: image 6.1.7650.0, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:19 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP\kdexts.dll]
After loading it however with .load ntsdexts, we can then see it's in the list:
lkd> .chain
Extension DLL search Path:
C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\arcade;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\pri;C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86);C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\arcade;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem
Extension DLL chain:
ntsdexts: image 6.1.7650.0, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:08 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP\ntsdexts.dll]
dbghelp: image 6.12.0002.633, API 6.1.6, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:26 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\dbghelp.dll]
ext: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:31 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\ext.dll]
exts: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:24 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP\exts.dll]
kext: image 6.12.0002.633, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:22 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\winext\kext.dll]
kdexts: image 6.1.7650.0, API 1.0.0, built Mon Feb 01 15:08:19 2010
[path: C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\WINXP\kdexts.dll]
Let's now run !dreg again with our path to MRxCls:
lkd> !dreg System\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls
Subkey: Enum
There it is, and we can see its subkey is Enum. We can confirm that looking back at the screenshot of its registry location above from earlier.
Here were the overall changes in the registry comparing pre-infection > post-infection:
----------------------------------
Keys deleted: 23
----------------------------------
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Enum
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Enum
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Enum
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Enum
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\0
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell
----------------------------------
Values deleted: 110
----------------------------------
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Service: "MRxCls"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Legacy: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\ConfigFlags: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Class: "LegacyDriver"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\ClassGUID: "{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\DeviceDesc: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control\*NewlyCreated*: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control\ActiveService: "MRxCls"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Service: "MRxNet"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Legacy: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\ConfigFlags: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Class: "LegacyDriver"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\ClassGUID: "{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\DeviceDesc: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control\*NewlyCreated*: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control\ActiveService: "MRxNet"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Description: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\DisplayName: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\ErrorControl: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Group: "Network"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\ImagePath: "\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\mrxcls.sys"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Start: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Type: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Data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
C4 87 21 91 4F D0 6E FA C4 DD B7 C9 AF E2 AE FE 14 0F 53 C4 BA DD 31 1A 38 7B 37 C0 9E 83 FF 2C B2 4C 88 33 C1 89 E5 CA 68 31 2D 20 CE 50 64 7B 39 C7 FB B1 9F A9 0D 6C 2A 82 AE 7F 25 43 A7 A2 28 EB 27 73 C9 45 F9 FD 53 A8 F4 A7 FD B4 90 B2 28 D8 0C 5A A8 84 D0 7F ED 99 25 18 FE B8 4C 48 66 8D 59 40 F6 CC 30 A6 F4 04 E8 76 9C EA 0E F6 A4 4A CE D2
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Enum\0: "Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Enum\Count: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxCls\Enum\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Description: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\DisplayName: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\ErrorControl: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Group: "Network"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\ImagePath: "\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\mrxnet.sys"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Start: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Type: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Enum\0: "Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000"
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Enum\Count: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\MRxNet\Enum\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Service: "MRxCls"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Legacy: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\ConfigFlags: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Class: "LegacyDriver"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\ClassGUID: "{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\DeviceDesc: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control\*NewlyCreated*: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000\Control\ActiveService: "MRxCls"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Service: "MRxNet"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Legacy: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\ConfigFlags: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Class: "LegacyDriver"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\ClassGUID: "{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\DeviceDesc: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control\*NewlyCreated*: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000\Control\ActiveService: "MRxNet"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Description: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\DisplayName: "MRXCLS"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\ErrorControl: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Group: "Network"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\ImagePath: "\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\mrxcls.sys"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Start: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Type: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Data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
DA C4 87 21 91 4F D0 6E FA C4 DD B7 C9 AF E2 AE FE 14 0F 53 C4 BA DD 31 1A 38 7B 37 C0 9E 83 FF 2C B2 4C 88 33 C1 89 E5 CA 68 31 2D 20 CE 50 64 7B 39 C7 FB B1 9F A9 0D 6C 2A 82 AE 7F 25 43 A7 A2 28 EB 27 73 C9 45 F9 FD 53 A8 F4 A7 FD B4 90 B2 28 D8 0C 5A A8 84 D0 7F ED 99 25 18 FE B8 4C 48 66 8D 59 40 F6 CC 30 A6 F4 04 E8 76 9C EA 0E F6 A4 4A CE D2
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Enum\0: "Root\LEGACY_MRXCLS\0000"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Enum\Count: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxCls\Enum\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Description: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\DisplayName: "MRXNET"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\ErrorControl: 0x00000000
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Group: "Network"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\ImagePath: "\??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\mrxnet.sys"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Start: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Type: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Enum\0: "Root\LEGACY_MRXNET\0000"
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Enum\Count: 0x00000001
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\MRxNet\Enum\NextInstance: 0x00000001
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHAPCY:gvzrqngr.pcy: 04 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 54 07 85 81 FE CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU:P:\Qbphzragf naq Frggvatf\Bjare\Qrfxgbc\ZJ\Ybgf bs Fghkarg\fazj\znyjner.rkr: 04 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 50 13 53 27 90 93 CA 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\0: 34 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 2C 3C 8C 70 10 00 73 6E 6D 77 00 00 20 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 2C 3C 8C 70 2C 3C 8C 70 14 00 00 00 73 00 6E 00 6D 00 77 00 00 00 14 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\0\NodeSlot: 0x00000022
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\0\MRUListEx: FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\FolderType: "Documents"
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Mode: 0x00000006
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\ScrollPos1280x720(1).x: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\ScrollPos1280x720(1).y: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Sort: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\SortDir: 0x00000001
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Col: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\ColInfo: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FD DF DF FD 0F 00 06 00 28 00 10 00 34 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 B4 00 60 00 78 00 78 00 B4 00 B4 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\MinPos1280x720(1).x: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\MinPos1280x720(1).y: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\MaxPos1280x720(1).x: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\MaxPos1280x720(1).y: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).left: 0x000000CB
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).top: 0x00000034
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).right: 0x000003EB
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).bottom: 0x0000028C
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Rev: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\WFlags: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\ShowCmd: 0x00000001
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\FFlags: 0x00000001
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\HotKey: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Buttons: 0xFFFFFFFF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Links: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Address: 0x00000000
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\34\Shell\Vid: "{65F125E5-7BE1-4810-BA9D-D271C8432CE3}"
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache\C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Desktop\MW\Lots of Stuxnet\snmw\malware.exe: "malware"
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\WinRAR\Interface\ShowPassword: 0x00000000
----------------------------------
Values modified: 17
----------------------------------
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed: 5B 70 29 6B 9F F8 6B 2E 27 BB 05 43 02 B3 42 43 88 7C 39 EA 7C 8F C3 C1 DA 61 6A 7A 3D A9 27 BB 06 12 F2 A2 B5 89 09 83 C9 CE 03 F8 7F 6C 1E 79 D9 10 7D F0 29 05 03 B9 29 88 8C EC E2 3C CB 04 12 E3 E3 EC 8F E6 27 0A 15 A9 09 6C 29 34 89 55
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed: 53 06 23 D9 FE 36 71 5D D7 02 23 98 92 D3 0C AA 52 45 17 A4 D9 2B 2E E6 C7 C1 12 FE D2 A0 E1 8A 5F CF 23 E0 9B 16 74 7E DC 38 BF 7E D6 F0 9F 97 9A 5B C8 12 7C C2 9E CE EF 95 DE D1 60 56 23 7A 21 96 9C 23 E4 CF D9 77 67 97 F4 EA F1 0D 25 18
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{5E6AB780-7743-11CF-A12B-00AA004AE837}\Count\HRZR_PGYFRFFVBA: 81 9C 54 0E 05 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{5E6AB780-7743-11CF-A12B-00AA004AE837}\Count\HRZR_PGYFRFFVBA: E3 F3 7F 0E 04 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU: 04 00 00 00 79 00 00 00 E0 8D E6 42 90 93 CA 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU: 04 00 00 00 77 00 00 00 A0 EC DC 76 81 FE CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHAPCY: 04 00 00 00 0B 00 00 00 00 54 07 85 81 FE CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHAPCY: 01 00 00 00 0B 00 00 00 60 F6 98 73 27 F4 CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_HVFPHG: 04 00 00 00 4C 00 00 00 F0 8C 4C 41 90 93 CA 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_HVFPHG: 04 00 00 00 4A 00 00 00 90 73 55 73 81 FE CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU:P:\Qbphzragf naq Frggvatf\Bjare\Qrfxgbc\FlfGbbyf\Nhgbehaf\nhgbehaf.rkr: 04 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 E0 8D E6 42 90 93 CA 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count\HRZR_EHACNGU:P:\Qbphzragf naq Frggvatf\Bjare\Qrfxgbc\FlfGbbyf\Nhgbehaf\nhgbehaf.rkr: 04 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 50 F6 45 98 7E FE CF 01
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\1\Desktop\ItemPos1280x720(1): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 16 02 00 00 14 00 1F 60 40 F0 5F 64 81 50 1B 10 9F 08 00 AA 00 2F 95 4E 15 00 00 00 4E 00 00 00 5A 00 3A 00 D4 02 00 00 5E 45 49 46 20 00 4D 4F 5A 49 4C 4C 7E 31 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 3E 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 49 46 6C 45 D2 6B 14 00 00 00 4D 00 6F 00 7A 00 69 00 6C 00 6C 00 61 00 20 00 46 00 69 00 72 00 65 00 66 00 6F 00 78 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 CA 01 00 00 34 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 5E 45 65 50 10 00 6D 62 61 72 00 00 20 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 63 50 5F 45 8D 55 14 00 00 00 6D 00 62 00 61 00 72 00 00 00 14 00 60 00 00 00 CA 01 00 00 2E 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 4F 6C 10 00 4D 57 00 00 1C 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 48 6C 6C 45 4F 6C 14 00 00 00 4D 00 57 00 00 00 12 00 60 00 00 00 E6 00 00 00 3C 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6A 45 6B 21 10 00 6F 64 62 67 31 31 30 00 26 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE
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00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 ED 46 6C 45 75 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 44 00 6F 00 77 00 6E 00 6C 00 6F 00 61 00 64 00 73 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 E6 00 00 00 62 00 32 00 8A 02 00 00 5E 45 58 47 20 00 53 48 4F 52 54 43 7E 32 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 46 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 58 47 6C 45 E5 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 66 00 69 00 72 00 65 00 66 00 6F 00 78 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 32 01 00 00 60 00 32 00 DF 02 00 00 5E 45 A8 48 20 00 53 48 4F 52 54 43 7E 33 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 44 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 A8 48 6C 45 5A 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 77 00 69 00 6E 00 64 00 62 00 67 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 60 00 00 00 7E 01 00 00 50 00 32 00 F1 85 3F 00 5F 45 09 56 20 00 54 44 53 53 4B 49 7E 31 2E 5A 49 50 00 00 34 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5F 45 09 56 6C 45
75 6C 14 00 00 00 74 00 64 00 73 00 73 00 6B 00 69 00 6C 00 6C 00 65 00 72 00 2E 00 7A 00 69 00 70 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 7E 01 00 00 4C 00 32 00 00 CE 05 00 5E 45 3B 50 20 00 74 67 32 69 6A 6E 6A 69 2E 65 78 65 00 00 30 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 3A 50 5E 45 35 83 14 00 00 00 74 00 67 00 32 00 69 00 6A 00 6E 00 6A 00 69 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 7E 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\1\Desktop\ItemPos1280x720(1): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 16 02 00 00 14 00 1F 60 40 F0 5F 64 81 50 1B 10 9F 08 00 AA 00 2F 95 4E 15 00 00 00 4E 00 00 00 5A 00 3A 00 D4 02 00 00 5E 45 49 46 20 00 4D 4F 5A 49 4C 4C 7E 31 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 3E 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 49 46 6C 45 D2 6B 14 00 00 00 4D 00 6F 00 7A 00 69 00 6C 00 6C 00 61 00 20 00 46 00 69 00 72 00 65 00 66 00 6F 00 78 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 CA 01 00 00 34 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 5E 45 65 50 10 00 6D 62 61 72 00 00 20 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 63 50 5F 45 8D 55 14 00 00 00 6D 00 62 00 61 00 72 00 00 00 14 00 60 00 00 00 CA 01 00 00 2E 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 4F 6C 10 00 4D 57 00 00 1C 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 48 6C 6C 45 4F 6C 14 00 00 00 4D 00 57 00 00 00 12 00 60 00 00 00 E6 00 00 00 3C 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6A 45 6B 21 10 00 6F 64 62 67 31 31 30 00 26 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE
6A 45 F4 1A 6C 45 59 6C 14 00 00 00 6F 00 64 00 62 00 67 00 31 00 31 00 30 00 00 00 16 00 60 00 00 00 16 02 00 00 40 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 84 6C 10 00 53 79 73 54 6F 6F 6C 73 00 00 28 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 73 6C 6C 45 84 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 79 00 73 00 54 00 6F 00 6F 00 6C 00 73 00 00 00 18 00 15 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 3C 00 32 00 5F 38 1C 00 5E 45 EF 45 20 00 62 65 72 2E 72 61 72 00 26 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 EF 45 6C 45 AE 6B 14 00 00 00 62 00 65 00 72 00 2E 00 72 00 61 00 72 00 00 00 16 00 60 00 00 00 32 01 00 00 4E 00 32 00 78 ED 9C 00 5E 45 D0 51 20 00 48 49 54 4D 41 4E 7E 31 2E 45 58 45 00 00 32 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 C6 51 6A 45 87 28 14 00 00 00 48 00 69 00 74 00 6D 00 61 00 6E 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 1C 00 60 00 00 00 4E 00 00 00 5C 00 32 00 8B 02 00 00 6A 45 80 12 20 00 49 44 41 50 52 4F 7E 31 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 40 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6A 45 80 12 6A 45 E7 1A 14 00 00 00 49 00 44 00 41 00 20 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 20 00 28 00 33 00 32 0
0 2D 00 62 00 69 00 74 00 29 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 60 00 00 00 9A 00 00 00 5C 00 32 00 97 02 00 00 6A 45 80 12 20 00 49 44 41 50 52 4F 7E 32 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 40 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6A 45 80 12 6A 45 F3 1E 14 00 00 00 49 00 44 00 41 00 20 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 20 00 28 00 36 00 34 00 2D 00 62 00 69 00 74 00 29 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 60 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 52 00 32 00 CE 02 00 00 5E 45 74 83 20 00 4F 53 46 4F 52 45 7E 31 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 36 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 74 83 6A 45 12 59 14 00 00 00 4F 00 53 00 46 00 6F 00 72 00 65 00 6E 00 73 00 69 00 63 00 73 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 9A 00 00 00 66 00 32 00 97 01 00 00 5E 45 ED 46 20 00 53 48 4F 52 54 43 7E 31 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 4A 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 ED 46 6C 45 75 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 44 00 6F 00 77 00 6E 00 6C 00 6F 00 61 00 64 00 73 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 E6 00 00 00 62 00 32
00 8A 02 00 00 5E 45 58 47 20 00 53 48 4F 52 54 43 7E 32 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 46 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 58 47 6A 45 F3 1E 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 66 00 69 00 72 00 65 00 66 00 6F 00 78 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 32 01 00 00 60 00 32 00 DF 02 00 00 5E 45 A8 48 20 00 53 48 4F 52 54 43 7E 33 2E 4C 4E 4B 00 00 44 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45 A8 48 6C 45 5A 6C 14 00 00 00 53 00 68 00 6F 00 72 00 74 00 63 00 75 00 74 00 20 00 74 00 6F 00 20 00 77 00 69 00 6E 00 64 00 62 00 67 00 2E 00 6C 00 6E 00 6B 00 00 00 1C 00 60 00 00 00 7E 01 00 00 50 00 32 00 F1 85 3F 00 5F 45 09 56 20 00 54 44 53 53 4B 49 7E 31 2E 5A 49 50 00 00 34 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5F 45 09 56 6C 45 75 6C 14 00 00 00 74 00 64 00 73 00 73 00 6B 00 69 00 6C 00 6C 00 65 00 72 00 2E 00 7A 00 69 00 70 00 00 00 1C 00 15 00 00 00 7E 01 00 00 4C 00 32 00 00 CE 05 00 5E 45 3B 50 20 00 74 67 32 69 6A 6E 6A 69 2E 65 78 65 00 00 30 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 5E 45
3A 50 5E 45 35 83 14 00 00 00 74 00 67 00 32 00 69 00 6A 00 6E 00 6A 00 69 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 1C 00 AB 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 4C 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 0F 6D 10 00 52 45 47 53 48 4F 7E 31 2E 30 00 00 32 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 0F 6D 6C 45 12 6D 14 00 00 00 52 00 65 00 67 00 73 00 68 00 6F 00 74 00 2D 00 31 00 2E 00 39 00 2E 00 30 00 00 00 1A 00 AB 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\NodeSlots: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\NodeSlots: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\MRUListEx: 07 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\MRUListEx: 08 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\MRUListEx: 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\6\0\MRUListEx: FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\7\MRUListEx: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRU\7\MRUListEx: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\27\Shell\ItemPos1280x720(1): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 4E 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 23 70 10 00 4C 4F 54 53 4F 46 7E 31 00 00 36 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 3C 6C 6C 45 23 70 14 00 00 00 4C 00 6F 00 74 00 73 00 20 00 6F 00 66 00 20 00 53 00 74 00 75 00 78 00 6E 00 65 00 74 00 00 00 18 00 DC 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 34 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 51 6C 10 00 54 44 4C 34 00 00 20 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 4F 6C 6C 45 51 6C 14 00 00 00 54 00 44 00 4C 00 34 00 00 00 14 00 DC 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\27\Shell\ItemPos1280x720(1): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 4E 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 E9 6C 10 00 4C 4F 54 53 4F 46 7E 31 00 00 36 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 3C 6C 6C 45 E9 6C 14 00 00 00 4C 00 6F 00 74 00 73 00 20 00 6F 00 66 00 20 00 53 00 74 00 75 00 78 00 6E 00 65 00 74 00 00 00 18 00 DC 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 34 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 6C 45 51 6C 10 00 54 44 4C 34 00 00 20 00 03 00 04 00 EF BE 6C 45 4F 6C 6C 45 51 6C 14 00 00 00 54 00 44 00 4C 00 34 00 00 00 14 00 DC 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).left: 0x00000049
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).left: 0x0000002C
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).top: 0x00000057
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).top: 0x0000003A
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).right: 0x00000369
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).right: 0x0000034C
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).bottom: 0x000002AF
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags\29\Shell\WinPos1280x720(1).bottom: 0x00000292
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\SessionInformation\ProgramCount: 0x00000002
HKU\S-1-5-21-515967899-1935655697-682003330-1003\SessionInformation\ProgramCount: 0x00000001
----------------------------------
Total changes: 150
----------------------------------
23 deleted keys, 110 values deleted, 17 values modified. Total = 150 changes.
Overall, there's a lot to this rootkit. I didn't go into the MRxCls configuration file decryption, network changes/attack methods, other methods of zero-day flaws, etc but even so you can see that this is a pretty sophisticated piece of malware. However, as we now see, its biggest downfall was its complete lack of protection.
The only personal explanation I have for this is that the creator(s) were either rushed to get it done by 'x' timeframe, so they focused on main code more than obfuscation, or they just imagined it wouldn't ever escape its original intended environment, so they'd never have to worry about reverse engineering being an issue.
References
Stuxnet Under the Microscope.
Analyzing a Stuxnet Infection with the Sysinternals Tools.
